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CATEGORICAL LARGE CARDINALS AND THE TENSION
BETWEEN CATEGORICITY AND SET-THEORETIC
REFLECTION
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND HANS ROBIN SOLBERG
Abstract. Inspired by Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity result characterizing the
models of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC2, we investigate when
those models are fully categorical, characterized by the addition to ZFC2 ei-
ther of a first-order sentence, a first-order theory, a second-order sentence or a
second-order theory. The heights of these models, we define, are the categor-
ical large cardinals. We subsequently consider various philosophical aspects
of categoricity for structuralism and realism, including the tension between
categoricity and set-theoretic reflection, and we present (and criticize) a cat-
egorical characterization of the set-theoretic universe 〈V,∈〉 in second-order
logic.
Categorical accounts of various mathematical structures lie at the very core of
structuralist mathematical practice, enabling mathematicians to refer to specific
mathematical structures, not by having carefully to prepare and point at specially
constructed instances—preserved like the one-meter iron bar locked in a case in
Paris—but instead merely by mentioning features that uniquely characterize the
structure up to isomorphism.
The natural numbers 〈N, 0, S〉, for example, are uniquely characterized by the
Dedekind axioms, which assert that 0 is not a successor, that the successor func-
tion S is one-to-one, and that every set containing 0 and closed under successor
contains every number [Ded88, Ded01]. We know what we mean by the natural
numbers—they have a definiteness—because we can describe features that com-
pletely determine the natural number structure. The real numbers 〈R,+, ·, 0, 1〉
similarly are characterized up to isomorphism as the unique complete ordered field
[Hun03]. The complex numbers 〈C,+, ·〉 form the unique algebraically closed field
of characteristic 0 and size continuum, or alternatively, the unique algebraic closure
of the real numbers. In fact all our fundamental mathematical structures enjoy such
categorical characterizations, where a theory is categorical if it identifies a unique
mathematical structure up to isomorphism—any two models of the theory are iso-
morphic. In light of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, which prevents categoricity
for infinite structures in first-order logic, these categorical theories are generally
made in second-order logic.
In set theory, Zermelo characterized the models of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory ZFC2 in his famous quasi-categoricity result:
Commentary can be made about this article on the first author’s blog at
http://jdh.hamkins.org/categorical-large-cardinals.
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Theorem 1 (Zermelo [Zer30]1). The models of ZFC2 are precisely those isomorphic
to a rank-initial segment 〈Vκ,∈〉 of the cumulative set-theoretic universe V cut off
at an inaccessible cardinal κ.
To prove this, Zermelo observed that if M is a model of the second-order axiom-
atization of set theory ZFC2, with the full second-order replacement axiom, then
M will be well-founded, since it will contain all its ω-sequences; so it will be (iso-
morphic to) a transitive set; it will be correct about power sets; consequently, M ’s
internal cumulative Vα hierarchy will agree with the actual Vα hierarchy, and the
height κ = OrdM will have to be both regular and a strong limit. So M will be Vκ
for some inaccessible cardinal; and conversely, all such Vκ are models of ZFC2.
It follows that for any two models of ZFC2, one of them is isomorphic to an
initial segment of the other. These set-theoretic models 〈Vκ,∈〉 have now come
to be known as Zermelo-Grothendieck universes, in light of Grothendieck’s use of
them in category theory (a rediscovery several decades after Zermelo); they feature
in the universe axiom, which asserts that every set is an element of some such Vκ,
or equivalently, that there are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals.
In this article, we seek to investigate the extent to which Zermelo’s quasi-
categoricity analysis can rise fully to the level of categoricity, in light of the ob-
servation that many of the Vκ universes are categorically characterized by their
sentences or theories.
Main Question 2. Which models of ZFC2 satisfy fully categorical theories?
If κ is the smallest inaccessible cardinal, for example, then up to isomorphism
〈Vκ,∈〉 is the unique model of ZFC2 satisfying the first-order sentence “there are
no inaccessible cardinals.” The least inaccessible cardinal is therefore an instance
of what we call a first-order sententially categorical cardinal. Similar ideas apply to
the next inaccessible cardinal, and the next, and so on for quite a long way. Many
of the inaccessible universes thus satisfy categorical theories extending ZFC2 by a
sentence or theory, either in first or second order, and we should like to investigate
these categorical extensions of ZFC2.
In addition, we shall discuss the philosophical relevance of categoricity and point
particularly to the philosophical problem posed by the tension between the wide-
spread support for categoricity in our fundamental mathematical structures with
set-theoretic ideas on reflection principles, which are at heart anti-categorical.
1. Main definition and preliminary results
Our main theme concerns these notions of categoricity:
Main Definition 3.
(1) A cardinal κ is first-order sententially categorical, if there is a first-order
sentence σ in the language of set theory, such that Vκ is categorically char-
acterized by ZFC2 + σ.
1Zermelo was more generally concerned with the urelement-based versions of set theory, and
what he proved in [Zer30] is that the models of second-order ZF−infinity with urelements are
determined by two cardinals—their inaccessible cardinal height (allowing ω when the infinity
axiom fails) and the number of urelements. In this article, we shall focus on the case of ZFC2,
where there are no urelements and the axiom of infinity holds.
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(2) A cardinal κ is first-order theory categorical, if there is a first-order theory
T in the language of set theory, such that Vκ is categorically characterized
by ZFC2 + T .
(3) A cardinal κ is second-order sententially categorical, if there is a second-
order sentence σ in the language of set theory, such that Vκ is categorically
characterized by ZFC2 + σ.
(4) A cardinal κ is second-order theory categorical, if there is a second-order
theory T in the language of set theory, such that Vκ is categorically char-
acterized by ZFC2 + T .
One may easily refine and extend these definitions by stratifying on complexity.
Thus, we will have natural notions of Σmn categoricity in mth-order set theory,
including Σαn categoricity for transfinite order α, for either theories or sentences.
And one may also consider categoricity in infinitary languages and so on. In this
article, however, let us focus on the categoricity notions in the main definition.
Since Zermelo characterized the inaccessible cardinals κ as those for which Vκ |=
ZFC2, all the cardinals κ in the main definition above are inaccessible. We could
equivalently have defined that κ is first-order sententially categorical if there is a
first-order sentence σ such that κ is the only inaccessible cardinal for which Vκ |= σ.
And similarly with the other kinds of categorical cardinals. In this sense, the topic
is about categorical characterizations of Vκ for inaccessible κ.
We find it interesting to notice that theory categoricity is akin to Leibnizian
discernibility, since κ is theory categorical when Vκ can be distinguished from other
candidates Vλ by a sentence.
If there are any inaccessible cardinals at all, then there will be easy examples of
categorical cardinals. As we mentioned earlier, the least inaccessible cardinal κ is
characterized over ZFC2 by “there are no inaccessible cardinals.” The next inac-
cessible cardinal is characterized by the first-order sentence, “there is exactly one
inaccessible cardinal.” More generally, the αth inaccessible cardinal (if we index
from 0) is characterized by the assertion “there are exactly α many inaccessible
cardinals.” If α is sufficiently absolutely definable, then this assertion can be made
without parameters and so the αth inaccessible cardinal will be sententially cate-
gorical. So the categorical cardinals proceed from the beginning for quite a long
way, up to the ωCK1 th inaccessible cardinal and beyond. Since we have observed
that the smallest large cardinals are generally categorical, there is a sense in which
categoricity is a smallness notion, while non-categoricity is a largeness notion. Yet,
the ω1th inaccessible cardinal if it exists is sententially categorical, and the ω2nd,
and more. And thus we seem to open the door to the possibility of gaps in the
categorical cardinals, since there are only countably many sentences.
Observation 4. Categoricity is downward absolute from V to any Vθ. That is, if
κ is categorical in one of the four manners of the main definition and θ > κ, then
the structure Vθ knows that κ is categorical in that way.
Proof. The point is that Vθ can verify that Vκ has whatever theory it has and there
are fewer challenges to categoricity in Vθ than in V . Every inaccessible cardinal δ
in Vθ is also inaccessible in V , and consequently differs in its theory from Vκ, and
Vθ can see this. 
Upward absoluteness might seem at first to be too much to ask for, since perhaps
a cardinal κ can be categorical inside Vθ only because θ is not large enough to reveal
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the other models Vλ that satisfy that same characterization. But for sentential
categoricity, it turns out that this situation never actually arises, and consequently
sentential categoricity is fully absolute between V and Vθ.
Theorem 5. Sentential categoricity (first and second order) is absolute between V
and any Vθ, both upward and downward. That is, if κ < θ, then κ is sententially
categorical in V if and only if it has the same sentential categoricity in Vθ.
Proof. If κ is sententially categorical in V , then it is sententially categorical in Vθ
by the same sentence, since there are fewer competitors inside Vθ than in V .
Conversely, suppose that κ is sententially categorical inside Vθ with κ < θ.
So there is a sentence σ, such that Vκ |= σ and no other Vλ in Vθ satisfies σ. In
particular, Vκ is the first inaccessible level to satisfy σ, and so the sentence σ+“there
is no inaccessible δ with Vδ |= σ” is a categorical characterization of Vκ in the full
universe V . No larger inaccessible level can satisfy this sentence, since Vκ |= σ. So
κ is sententially categorical in V . 
Another way to describe the upward absoluteness is that failures of sentential
categoricity are always witnessed by smaller as opposed to larger inaccessible car-
dinals with the same sentence. Thus, every failure of sentential categoricity leads
to instances of inaccessible reflection. In the first-order case, one can view this as a
weak form of Mahloness, since every Mahlo cardinal also has this property. In the
second-order case, it is a weak form of indescribability.
Theorem 6. If an inaccessible cardinal κ is not sententially categorical (either first
or second order), then every sentence σ of that order that is true in Vκ is also true
in Vδ for some smaller inaccessible cardinal δ < κ.
Proof. If σ is true in Vκ, then it cannot be the first time this happens at an inacces-
sible cardinal, since otherwise this very situation could be described in a sentence,
providing a categorical characterization of κ. 
The corresponding fact is not true for theory categoricity, if one expects to
reflect the whole theory, because failures of theory categoricity arise when there
is some κ < λ with Vκ and Vλ having the same theory. But in this case, there
will be some smallest κ with that theory, and this κ is not theory categorical,
but this is not witnessed by any smaller δ < κ precisely because κ was already
the smallest with that theory. In particular, the analogue of theorem 5 also fails
for theory categoricity, because if κ is the least inaccessible cardinal that is not
theory categorical, then there will be some λ > κ with the same theory, and if λ
is smallest with this property, then κ will be theory categorical inside Vλ, but not
in V . Nevertheless, there is an approximation version of downward reflection for
failures of theory categoricity, which can be seen as a somewhat stronger version of
weak Mahloness.
Theorem 7. If an inaccessible cardinal κ is not first-order theory categorical, then
for every natural number n, there is a smaller inaccessible cardinal δ < κ for
which Vδ has the same Σn theory. And similarly, if κ is not second-order theory
categorical, there for every n there is a smaller inaccessible Vδ with the same Σ
1
n
theory.
Proof. Suppose that κ is not first-order theory categorical. Then there is some
other inaccessible cardinal λ for which Vκ and Vλ have the same theory. If λ < κ,
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then we are done immediately. So assume λ > κ. Notice that Vλ thinks that its
Σn theory is shared by Vκ. So it is part of the theory of Vλ that there is a smaller
inaccessible cardinal with the same Σn theory. So this statement is also true in Vκ,
as desired. The argument works the same with first-order or second-order. 
The general phenomenon is that failures of categoricity lead to inaccessible re-
flection, which we view as weak forms of Mahloness and indescribability.
Let us now establish an upward transmission effect of categoricity. For any
cardinal κ, we use the boldface successor notation κ to denote the next inaccessible
cardinal above κ.
Theorem 8. If κ is second-order sententially categorical, then κ is first-order
sententially categorical.
Proof. If ψ is the second-order sentence characterizing Vκ, then the next inaccessible
cardinal Vκ can see that there is a largest inaccessible cardinal κ and that Vκ
satisfies ψ, and this property characterizes κ . 
Theorem 9. If κ is inaccessible and the sententially categorical cardinals are un-
bounded in the inaccessible cardinals below κ, then κ is first-order theory categorical.
Proof. Note that we are not assuming that κ is a limit of inaccessible cardinals.
The first-order theory of Vκ includes the assertions that those smaller inaccessible
cardinals satisfy the sentences that characterize them, whether those are first or
second order. Therefore no smaller inaccessible cardinal δ < κ can have Vδ with
the same theory as Vκ. And no larger θ > κ can have the same theory either, since
in Vθ either there are new sententially categorical cardinals, and the assertion that
they exist would be part of the theory of Vθ not true in Vκ, or else the sententially
categorical cardinals will not be unbounded in the inaccessible cardinals below θ,
which will itself be a statement true in Vθ that is not true in Vκ. 
Theorem 10. No Mahlo cardinal is first-order theory categorical.
Proof. If κ is Mahlo, then Vδ ≺ Vκ for a closed unbounded set of δ, which therefore
includes many inaccessible cardinals. So Vκ is not characterized by any first-order
sentence or theory. 
Theorem 11. The least Mahlo cardinal is second-order sententially categorical,
but not first-order theory categorical.
Proof. Being Mahlo is a Π11 property: every club C ⊆ κ has a regular cardinal.
So the least one is second-order sententially categorical. But no Mahlo cardinal is
first-order sententially or theory categorical by the above. 
Let us consider versions of theorem 10 for weaker large cardinal notions. An
ordinal κ is otherworldly if Vκ ≺ Vβ for some ordinal β > κ. (It is an interesting
exercise to show that otherworldly cardinals are in fact also worldly, which means
Vκ |= ZFC, but note that otherworldly cardinals, like the worldly cardinals, need
not be regular and hence are not necessarily inaccessible, although they are strong
limit cardinals and i-fixed points.) Every inaccessible cardinal δ is the limit of
a closed unbounded set of otherworldly cardinals, each of which is otherworldly
up to δ, meaning that the targets β can be found cofinally in δ. A cardinal κ is
totally otherworldly if Vκ ≺ Vβ for arbitrarily large ordinals β. Recall from [HJ14]
that a cardinal κ is uplifting if it is inaccessible and Vκ ≺ Vβ for arbitrarily large
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inaccessible cardinals β; the cardinal κ is pseudo-uplifting if Vκ ≺ Vβ for arbitrarily
large β, without insisting that β is inaccessible. So the pseudo-uplifting cardinals
are the same as the inaccessible totally otherworldly cardinals. All of these cardinals
are weaker in consistency strength than a Mahlo cardinal, since if δ is Mahlo, then
Vδ has a proper class of uplifting cardinals, which are therefore also pseudo-uplifting
and inaccessibly totally otherworldly. None of these types of cardinals, it turns out,
can be second-order theory categorical, in light of the following theorem.
Theorem 12. If Vκ ≺M for some transitive set M with Vκ+1 ⊆M , then κ is not
second-order theory categorical.
Proof. Assume Vκ ≺ M for a transitive set M with Vκ+1 ⊆ M . Let T be the
second-order theory of Vκ, and observe that M thinks “there is an inaccessible
cardinal δ such that the second-order theory of Vδ is T ,” since this is true in M of
δ = κ. So this statement must also be true in Vκ, and so there is δ < κ with Vδ
having the same theory as Vκ. So κ is not second-order theory categorical. 
It follows that no measurable cardinal is second-order theory categorical, nor is
any (κ+ 1)-strongly unfoldable cardinal κ, nor any Π21-indescribable cardinal, nor
any uplifting cardinal, nor any otherworldly cardinal, since all these types of large
cardinals satisfy the comparatively weak hypothesis of theorem 12.
Let us prove the following bound on the categorical cardinals. A cardinal θ is
Σ2 correct if Vθ ≺Σ2 V , that is, if every statement of complexity Σ2 (allowing
parameters) is absolute between Vθ and the full set-theoretic universe V . Every
totally otherworldly cardinal is Σ2-correct, as is every strong cardinal and hence
also every supercompact cardinal and every extendible cardinal.
Theorem 13. Every second-order theory categorical cardinal is below the least Σ2-
correct cardinal.
Proof. Suppose that θ is Σ2-correct, which means that any Σ2 assertion about
objects in Vθ that is true in V is true in Vθ. Suppose that κ is second-order theory
categorical, and let T be the second-order theory of Vκ. The assertion that there is a
cardinal κ for which Vκ |= T is a Σ2 assertion about T in the Le´vy hierarchy, because
it can be verified inside any sufficiently large Vη (see [Ham14a] for background on
locally verifiable properties). Therefore, κ must be inside Vθ. So every second-order
theory categorical cardinal must be below every Σ2-correct cardinal. 
The proof works just as well with third-order, fourth-order, and so on, up to αth
order for any α that is itself Σ2 definable, and so these kinds of categoricity are
also bounded by the Σ2-correct cardinals.
Theorem 13 seems to justify the view of categoricity as a smallness notion for
large cardinals, since they must all be below the Σ2 correct cardinals, and so they
are all therefore smaller than every strong cardinal, every supercompact cardinal,
every extendible cardinal, every totally otherworldly cardinal, and more, since these
cardinals are Σ2 correct. This view in turn leads to some philosophical tensions
with the idea that mathematicians seek categorical accounts of all their fundamental
structures. After all, for us to adopt one of the categorical axiomatizations that
characterize these categorical cardinals would be to adopt a theory that we know
must be describing a smallish set-theoretic universe. This is the opposite of what we
are trying to do in our set-theoretic foundations—we seek instead upward-reaching
axioms that will maximize our foundational realm and make it as large as possible,
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so as more fully to accommodate arbitrary mathematical structure and ideas. We
shall discuss this philosophical tension more fully in section 7.
Let us introduce the rank elementary forest on inaccessible cardinals, the relation
by which κ  λ if and only if Vκ ≺ Vλ, for inaccessible cardinals κ and λ. This is a
partial order on inaccessible cardinals, and it is a forest, since the predecessors of
any node are linearly ordered.
Theorem 14. Every first-order theory categorical cardinal is a stump in the rank
elementary forest, that is, a disconnected root node with nothing above it.
Proof. This is almost immediate from the definition. If κ is first-order theory
categorical, then we cannot have Vκ ≺ Vλ nor Vδ ≺ Vκ, and so κ must be a
stump. 
The converse is not true, since we can have Vκ ≡ Vλ without Vκ ≺ Vλ, and so it
seems possible to violate first-order theory categoricity while κ is still a stump. To
see this, let κ be the least inaccessible cardinal for which there is some ordinal λ
for which Vκ ≺ Vλ, and let λ be least with that property. It follows that Vλ thinks
that the theory T = Th(Vκ) is realized at an inaccessible cardinal, namely at κ, and
so Vκ should also think this about T . So there will be some inaccessible cardinal
δ < κ with Vδ ≡ Vκ. So Vλ will think that κ is a stump in the rank elementary
forest, but not first-order theory categorical.
Ultimately theory categoricity is about the relation of elementary equivalence
Vκ ≡ Vλ rather than the relation of elementary substructure Vκ ≺ Vλ, and so it is
sensible to consider the alternative forest, by which κ λ for inaccessible cardinals,
just in case κ ≤ λ and Vκ ≡ Vλ. In this case, a cardinal is first-order theory
categorical just in case it is a stump in the forest. And there is a corresponding
forest order 2 for second-order elementary equivalence Vκ ≡2 Vλ, by which the
second-order theory categorical cardinals are exactly the stumps of the 2-forest.
2. Gaps in the categorical cardinals
Let us now prove that there are various kinds of gaps in the categorical cardinals.
If there are sufficiently many inaccessible cardinals, then the categorical cardinals
(of any type) do not form an initial segment of the inaccessible cardinals.
Observation 15. If there are uncountably many inaccessible cardinals, then there
are some inaccessible cardinals that are neither first-order nor second-order senten-
tially categorical.
Proof. This is clear, because there are only countably many sentences, in either
first or second order, and we may associate each sententially categorical cardinal
with the sentence that characterizes it.2 This association is one-to-one between
the sententially categorical cardinals and a countable set. So there must be some
inaccessible cardinals that are not sententially categorical. 
Theorem 16. If there are any inaccessible cardinals that are not sententially cat-
egorical, then there are gaps in the sententially categorical cardinals.
(1) If κ is the least inaccessible cardinal that is not first-order sententially cat-
egorical, then κ , if it exists, is first-order sententially categorical.
2This is not an instance of the Math Tea argument, as discussed in [HLR13], since we are not
referring here to truth-in-the-universe V , but only to truth in set structures.
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(2) If κ is the least inaccessible cardinal that is not second-order sententially
categorical, then κ , if it exists, is first-order sententially categorical.
Proof. Suppose that κ is the least inaccessible cardinal that is not first-order sen-
tentially categorical. By theorems 5 and 6, this is observable inside any larger Vθ.
In particular, if κ exists, then Vκ can see that κ is not first-order sententially
categorical. Therefore, Vκ is categorically characterized by the sentence asserting,
“there is a largest inaccessible cardinal and it is the only inaccessible cardinal that
is not first-order sententially categorical.”
Essentially the same argument works if κ is the least inaccessible cardinal that
is not second-order sententially categorical. In this case, we still find a first-order
sentential characterization of Vκ , since it will be the only inaccessible model which
thinks there is a largest inaccessible cardinal which also is the only such cardinal
that is not second-order sententially categorical, and the point is that this is a first-
order assertion in Vκ since this model can define the truth predicate for Vκ, which
is a mere set in Vκ . 
If there are sufficiently many inaccessible cardinals, then the gaps become ar-
bitrarily complicated and self-reflecting, since if all the gaps in the sententially
categorical cardinals had the same simple nature, we could recognize the end of
the sententially categorical cardinals—the top gap in a sense—and thereby find an
inaccessible cardinal above it that would be characterized by seeing that there was
such a new large gap in the sententially categorical cardinals.
A similar analysis works for theory categoricity, even though we lack the ana-
logues of theorems 5 and 6 for theory categoricity.
Theorem 17. If there are at least c+ many inaccessible cardinals, then there are
gaps in the theory categorical cardinals. Indeed, there is a first-order sententially
categorical cardinal that is larger than some inaccessible cardinal that is not cate-
gorical either by sentences or theories, either first or second order.
Proof. Assume that there are at least c+ many inaccessible cardinals. Since there
are only continuum many possible theories, there must be an inaccessible cardinal
among the first c+ many that is not second-order theory categorical. If there is
actually a c+th inaccessible cardinal κ, then Vκ is characterized by the first-order
assertion that the order type of the inaccessible cardinals is exactly c+. So we may
assume that there is no c+th inaccessible, and so the order type of the inaccessible
cardinals in V is exactly c+. In this case, there will be some inaccessible cardinal θ
that can see that there is some cardinal that is not second-order theory categorical,
since above the least such cardinal, we need then also only to get above the other
cardinal with the same second-order theory as it to see that it is not. Let θ be
the least inaccessible cardinal such that Vθ can see that there is some inaccessible
cardinal that is not second-order theory categorical. We can express this property
as a first-order assertion in Vθ as follows:
Vθ |=“There is an inaccessible cardinal that is not second-order
theory categorical, but every smaller Vδ for δ inaccessible thinks
every inaccessible cardinal is second-order theory categorical.”
This is a first-order sentential characterization of θ, since no other inaccessible
cardinal can think that it also is the least to see this situation. So we have found
a first-order sententially categorical cardinal above an inaccessible cardinal that is
not second-order theory categorical. 
CATEGORICAL LARGE CARDINALS 9
3. On the number of categorical cardinals
There are, as we have mentioned, at most countably many sententially categorical
cardinals, either first or second order, simply because there are only countably many
sentences. And it is clear that if there are infinitely many inaccessible cardinals,
then there are infinitely many sententially categorical cardinals, because there is the
first one, the second, the third and so on, and these are each sententially categorical,
each characterized by the statement that there are exactly n inaccessible cardinals.
The first ω many inaccessible cardinals are all first-order sententially categorical in
this way.
Similarly, we have mentioned that because there are at most continuum many dif-
ferent theories, there will be at most continuum many theory categorical cardinals.
But how many different theory categorical cardinals must there be? If there are
uncountably many inaccessible cardinals, must there be uncountably many theory
categorical cardinals? Are each of the first ω1 many inaccessible cardinals theory
categorical? If there are at least continuum many inaccessible cardinals, must there
be continuum many theory-categorical cardinals? Surprisingly, the answers to all
these questions can be negative.
Theorem 18. It is relatively consistent with ZFC that the inaccessible cardinals
form a proper class but there are only countably many theory categorical cardinals.
This theorem is an immediate consequence of the following more specific theorem.
Theorem 19. Every model of ZFC has a forcing extension, preserving all inacces-
sible cardinals and creating no new ones, in which there are only countably many
second-order theory categorical cardinals.
Proof. Let G ⊆ Coll(ω, c) be V -generic for the forcing to collapse the continuum
to ω, and consider the forcing extension V [G]. This forcing is small relative to any
inaccessible cardinal, and so they are all preserved in the extension (and forcing
can never create new inaccessible cardinals). Furthermore, because this forcing is
homogenenous, it follows that the Boolean value [[ϕ(aˇ) ]] of any statement ϕ using
only check-name parameters aˇ from the ground model is either 0 or 1. And since
the forcing is definable in V , assertions about the Boolean value are expressible
in the language of set theory. Indeed, the theory of V [G]κ is the same as the
set of sentences ϕ for which the statement ‘[[ϕ ]] = 1’ is in the theory of Vκ in
the ground model. Therefore, the forcing does not create any new instances of
sentential or theory categoricity. Since the number of theory categorical cardinals
was at most continuum in the ground model, and this cardinal has been collapsed
to ω, it follows that there are only countably many theory categorical cardinals in
the forcing extension V [G]. 
Conversely, there can also be continuum many theory categorical cardinals.
Theorem 20. If there are at least continuum many inaccessible cardinals, then
there is a forcing extension, preserving the continuum and having exactly the same
inaccessible cardinals as the ground model, in which the first continuum many in-
accessible cardinals are all first-order theory categorical.
Proof. Assume that there are at least continuum many inaccessible cardinals in V .
Let κα be the αth inaccessible cardinal. Similarly, fix an enumeration 〈Aα | α < c〉
of the subsets Aα ⊆ ω. Since κα is regular and much larger than c, none of the
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κα for α < c are limits of inaccessible cardinals. Therefore, in every such Vκα , the
inaccessible cardinals will be strictly bounded below κα. We can therefore force so
as to code Aα into the GCH pattern at the first ω many regular cardinals above the
supremum of the inaccessible cardinals below κα. Using an Easton product, we can
perform all this forcing at once, making a forcing extension V [G] in which all the
coding is done, while neither creating nor destroying any inaccessible cardinals. In
V [G], the set Aα is definable in Vκα , since this model can define the supremum of
the inaccessible cardinals below κα and can observe the GCH pattern at the next
ω many successor cardinals. In particular, the particular sentences saying that the
nth successor above that supremum does have the GCH or does not are part of the
theory of Vκα . Since the particular patterns are all different, this means that these
cardinals all have different theories. And since they also each think that there are
fewer than continuum many inaccessible cardinals, these theories will also differ
from those of any Vκ above every κα. And so all these cardinals are first-order
theory categorical in V [G]. 
Let us also mention that if the GCH holds in the ground model, then the forcing
also preserves all cardinals and cofinalities.
We can also arrange that the number of theory categorical cardinals is strictly
between ℵ0 and the continuum.
Theorem 21. It is relatively consistent that the number of first-order theory cate-
gorical cardinals is ω1, even when the continuum is larger than this, and even when
the inaccessible cardinals form a proper class.
Proof. By theorem 20, we may begin with a model of set theory V in which there
are continuum many inaccessible cardinals that are first-order theory categorical.
And we may suppose as well that V has abundant inaccessible cardinals, if we
like. By forcing if necessary, we may also assume that the continuum hypothesis
holds, since this forcing is small, it neither creates nor destroys any inaccessible
cardinals, and if the first-order theory categorical cardinals are categorical in the
way described in theorem 20, by coding reals into the GCH pattern in the blocks
below the first continuum (now ω1) many inaccessible cardinals, then these cardinals
will remain first-order theory categorical after forcing the CH. So we have a model
with exactly ω1 many first-order theory categorical cardinals. We may now force
to V [G] by adding any number of Cohen reals via Add(ω, θ), for some definable
cardinal θ, such as θ = ℵ3. This forcing is small, definable and homogeneous, and
so it preserves all the inaccessible cardinals, preserves the coding making the first
ω1 many inaccessible cardinals first-order theory categorical, and it creates no new
instances of categoricity. So V [G] has the desired features. 
The argument is extremely flexible, and we could have arranged to have exactly
ℵ17 many first-order theory categorical cardinals, while the continuum is ℵω2+5, or
whatever, in diverse other possible combinations.
4. Complete implication diagram
Every first-order sententially categorical cardinal is of course also first-order the-
ory categorical, since the sentence is part of the theory, and similarly with second-
order; and first-order categoricity immediately implies second-order categoricity
for sentences or theories, since first-order assertions count as (trivial) instances
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of second-order assertions. What we aim to do now is prove that beyond these
immediate implications, there are no other provable implications.
Theorem 22. Assuming the consistency of sufficiently many inaccessible cardinals,
the complete provable implication diagram for the categoricity notions is as follows:
κ is first-order
sententially categorical
κ is first-order
theory categorical
κ is second-order
sententially categorical
κ is second-order
theory categorical
None of these implications are reversible and no other implications are provable.
In fact, we shall prove the following more refined result, which shows that we
cannot even get new implications by combining components of the diagram.
Theorem 23. Implications between the various categoricity notions are those shown
in the following Venn diagram, and if there are at least c+ many inaccessible car-
dinals, then every cell of the diagram is inhabited.
second-order
theory
categorical
second-order
sententially
categorical
first-order
theory
categorical
first-order
sententially
categorical
The positive implications of the diagram are in each case easy to prove, and
these correspond to the inclusions indicated in the Venn diagram. What remains
is to prove that all the various cells of the diagram are inhabited. To begin with
that, we have noted that if there are any inaccessible cardinals at all, then the least
inaccessible cardinal is first-order sententially categorical, and so the yellow region
at bottom is inhabited. Next, theorem 11 shows that the least Mahlo cardinal is
second-order sententially categorical but not first-order theory categorical, which
shows that the blue region at the right is inhabited. But in fact we can weaken the
hypothesis necessary for this as follows.
Theorem 24. If there is an inaccessible cardinal that is not first-order theory
categorical (for example, if there are at least c+ many inaccessible cardinals), then
there is an inaccessible cardinal that is second-order sententially categorical, but not
first-order theory categorical.
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Proof. If there are at least c+ many inaccessible cardinals, then there must be
an inaccessible cardinal that is not first-order theory categorical (nor even second-
order theory categorical), since there are at most continuum many possible theories.
If there is an inaccessible cardinal that is not first-order theory categorical, then
there are inaccessible cardinals δ < κ, such that Vδ and Vκ have the same first-order
theory. Let κ be least such that this situation arises. So certainly κ is not first-
order theory categorical. Nevertheless, the cardinal κ is characterized by a certain
property of the first-order truth predicate of Vκ, which is second-order definable.
With a single second-order sentence, we can assert that there is some inaccessible
cardinal δ < κ for which Vδ has the same first-order theory as Vκ, and that κ is least
for which this situation occurs. So κ is second-order sententially categorical. 
Next, to show that the red region at the left is inhabited, consider the following
theorem.
Theorem 25. If there are uncountably many inaccessible cardinals, then there is a
first-order theory categorical cardinal that is not second-order sententially categor-
ical.
Proof. This is an instance of theorem 9, but let us give the argument. Suppose that
there are uncountably many inaccessible cardinals. Since there are only countably
many second-order sentences, there are also only countably many second-order
sententially categorical cardinals. In particular, there are only countably many
second-order sententially categorical cardinals amongst the first ω1 many inacces-
sible cardinals. And so there will be a first inaccessible cardinal κ that is larger
than all of those. It is part of the first-order theory of Vκ that those other smaller
sententially categorical cardinals exist, that there are only countably many inacces-
sible cardinals, and there are no inaccessible cardinals above all of the sententially
categorical cardinals. So the theory of Vκ characterizes κ, since no other cardinal
can have exactly the same collection of second-order sententially categorical cardi-
nals and view itself as the next inaccessible cardinal after them. So κ is first-order
theory categorical. Since also it is amongst the first ω1 many inaccessible cardinals
and strictly larger than all sententially categorical cardinals in that interval, it is
not itself sententially categorical. 
Corollary 26. If the class of inaccessible cardinals has uncountable cofinality, then
the supremum of the first-order theory categorical cardinals is strictly larger than
the supremum of the second-order sententially categorical cardinals.
Proof. We can simply run the argument of theorem 25 by taking the first inaccessi-
ble cardinal κ larger than all second-order sententially categorical cardinals (instead
of just the first ω1 many). Since there are only countably many such sententially
categorical cardinals and the cofinality of the inaccessible cardinals is uncountable,
there will be such a cardinal κ. And now the argument of theorem 25 shows that κ
is first-order theory categorical, but strictly larger than all second-order sententially
categorical cardinals. 
Let us now prove that if there are sufficiently many large cardinals, then the
central dark purple region of the Venn diagram is inhabited. For a first argument,
we may modify the Mahlo cardinal argument of theorem 11 by defining that a
cardinal κ is (first-order) definably Mahlo, if every closed unbounded set C ⊆ κ
that is definable in Vκ from parameters in Vκ contains a regular cardinal. Another
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way to say this is that κ exhibits the Mahloness property for club sets definable
in Vκ.
Theorem 27. The least inaccessible definably Mahlo cardinal κ is second-order
sententially categorical and first-order theory categorical but not first-order senten-
tially categorical.
Proof. Let κ be the least inaccessible first-order definably Mahlo cardinal. For each
natural number n, there is by the reflection theorem a definable club of cardinals
δ < κ with Vδ ≺Σn Vκ. Since κ is definably Mahlo, this implies that there is some
inaccessible cardinal δ < κ with the same Σn theory as Vκ. So κ is not first-order
sententially categorical.
Meanwhile, the fact that κ is definably Mahlo is a property of its first-order
theory, because every instance of the definably Mahlo scheme is a first-order as-
sertion. And it is also part of the theory of Vκ that no smaller δ < κ is definably
Mahlo. So κ is first-order theory categorical, since no other cardinal can have this
combination.
Finally, κ is second-order sententially categorical, since the assertion that the
theory of Vκ contains that combination of statements is a single second-order as-
sertion about Vκ, namely, the assertion that, “in the unique truth predicate for
first-order truth, every instance of the definably Mahlo scheme comes out true, as
well as the assertion that no smaller inaccessible cardinal is definably Mahlo.”
So the least inaccessible definably Mahlo cardinal is second-order sententially
categorical, first-order theory categorical, but not first-order sententially categori-
cal. 
Meanwhile, as with theorem 24, we can also provide an example from a much
weaker large cardinal hypothesis.
Theorem 28. If there is an inaccessible cardinal that is not first-order sententially
categorical (for example, if there are uncountably many inaccessible cardinals), then
the least such cardinal is first-order theory categorical and second-order sententially
categorical, but not first-order sententially categorical.
Proof. Suppose that κ is the smallest inaccessible cardinal that is not first-order
sententially categorical. By theorem 6, this means κ is smallest with the property
that every first-order sentence σ true in Vκ is also true in some smaller inaccessible
Vδ. We claim that κ is first-order theory categorical, since it thinks that no smaller
inaccessible cardinal has the property we just described, and yet every instance
of the defining property of κ is part of the first-order theory of Vκ. So among
inaccessible cardinals, only Vκ will have that combination in its theory. Finally, we
claim also that κ is second-order sententially categorical, because first-order truth
in Vκ is second-order definable, and so the property that every first-order sentence
σ true in Vκ reflects to some inaccessible Vδ below is a single second-order assertion
about Vκ. So we can characterize Vκ by that property plus the assertion that no
smaller inaccessible cardinal has that property. 
Thus, if there are sufficiently many inaccessible cardinals, then the central dark
purple region of the Venn diagram is inhabited.
Finally, let us show that the light purple region at the top of the Venn diagram
also is inhabited.
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Theorem 29. If there is an inaccessible cardinal that is not second-order theory
categorical (for example, if there are at least c+ many inaccessible cardinals), then
there is an inaccessible cardinal that is second-order theory categorical, but neither
second-order sententially categorical nor first-order theory categorical.
Proof. If there is an inaccessible cardinal that is not second-order theory categorical,
then there are inaccessible cardinals δ < λ for which Vδ and Vλ have the same
second-order theory. In particular, λ has the property (as in theorem 7) that for
every natural number n, there is a smaller inaccessible cardinal δ < λ for which Vδ
has the same Σ1n theory as Vλ.
Let κ be the smallest inaccessible cardinal with that property, so that for any
natural number n, there is a smaller inaccessible cardinal δ for which Vδ has the
same Σ1n theory as Vκ. It follows that any second-order sentence true in Vκ is also
true in such a Vδ, and so κ is not second-order sententially categorical. But also,
we claim, κ is not first-order theory categorical, because the first-order theory of
Vκ is part of the Σ
1
1 theory of Vκ, as the truth predicate is definable at this level
(indeed, first-order truth has complexity ∆11). Namely, a first-order sentence ψ is
true in Vκ if and only if there is a class T obeying the Tarskian truth recursion—so
it is a truth predicate—according to which ψ is declared true. If Vδ has the same
Σ11 theory as Vκ, then they agree on the entire first-order theory, and so κ is not
first-order theory categorical. So this cardinal κ is as desired. 
Thus, we have established theorem 23 and therefore also theorem 22.
5. Categoricity and forcing
Let us make a few observations about the non-absoluteness of categoricity be-
tween a model of set theory and its forcing extensions. Any inaccessible cardinal
can be made into the least inaccessible cardinal of a forcing extension (see [Car17]),
and this will be first-order sententially categorical. Can we do it, however, while
preserving all inaccessible cardinals?
Question 30. Can every inaccessible cardinal become first-order sententially cate-
gorical in a forcing extension with the same inaccessible cardinals?
Yes, indeed, this is possible.
Theorem 31. If κ is an inaccessible cardinal, then there is a forcing extension
with exactly the same inaccessible cardinals in which κ is first-order sententially
categorical.
Proof. We claim that every inaccessible cardinal can be characterized in a forcing
extension as the least inaccessible cardinal that is a limit of failures of the GCH. To
see this, suppose that κ an inaccessible cardinal. Let V [C] be the forcing extension
arising from the forcing that shoots a club set C ⊆ κ avoiding the inaccessible
cardinals. Conditions are closed bounded sets in κ with no inaccessible cardinals,
ordered by end-extension. This forcing has δ-closed dense sets for every δ < κ, and
therefore it adds no new <κ-sequences over the ground model. It therefore preserves
Vκ and hence all inaccessible cardinals below κ; and it preserves the inaccessibility
of κ itself; and being size κ, it also preserves all larger inaccessible cardinals. In
V [C], therefore, we have ensured that κ is inaccessible, but not Mahlo, because we
now have a club in κ avoiding the inaccessible cardinals. In particular, κ is a limit
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of elements of C, but no other inaccessible cardinal is a limit of elements of C. Let
V [C][G] be the subsequent forcing extension that forces the GCH up to κ, except
at the successors of cardinals in C, where the continuum is the double successor.
This forcing preserves all inaccessible cardinals.
In V [C][G], the cardinal κ is an inaccessible limit of cardinals at which the GCH
fails, namely, the successors of the elements of C. But no smaller inaccessible
cardinal has that property, because C is bounded below every smaller inaccessible
cardinal. So κ is the least inaccessible cardinal that is a limit of failures of the GCH,
and this property provides a first-order sentential categorical characterization of κ
in the forcing extension V [C][G]. 
The theorem is an instance of the large cardinal killing-them-softly phenomenon
promulgated by Erin Carmody [Car17], who proved in a variety of cases that one
can often slightly reduce (as little reduced as possible) the large cardinal strength
of a large cardinal in a forcing extension. Theorem 31 achieves this, if we view non-
categoricity as a largeness notion—we have killed the non-categoricity of κ while
preserving its inaccessibility. But one might aspire to sharper (or we should say
softer) categoricity killing-them-softly results. For example, can we force any inac-
cessible cardinal that is not second-order theory categorical to become second-order
theory categorical, but neither first-order theory categorical nor second-order sen-
tentially categorical? Can we force any inaccessible cardinal that is not first-order
theory categorical to become first-order theory categorical, but not second-order
sententially categorical? Can we force any inaccessible cardinal that is not second-
order sententially categorical to become second-order sententially categorical, but
not first-order theory categorical? These would be softer killings of non-categoricity
than what we achieved in theorem 31.
6. Generalization to other cardinal notions
Let us prove a version of Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity theorem for the class of
worldly cardinals, where a cardinal κ is worldly if Vκ |= ZFC, meaning here just
the first-order theory ZFC.
Theorem 32. The models of ZFC+Zermelo2, that is, first-order ZFC with second-
order Zermelo set theory, are precisely the models Vκ for a worldly cardinal κ.
Proof. If κ is worldly, then Vκ is a model of ZFC which is correct about power sets,
and so it satisfies the second-order separation axiom and hence the second-order
Zermelo theory. Conversely, if M is a model of ZFC plus second-order Zermelo
set theory, then because of the second-order separation axiom, it will be correct
about power sets, and so the model will be well-founded—we may assume without
loss that it is transitive—and so the internal computation of the cumulative Vα
hierarchy will be correct. So M = Vκ for some ordinal κ for which Vκ |= ZFC,
meaning that κ is worldly. 
The theory ZFC+Zermelo2 can be equivalently described as ZFC+Separation2,
that is, with the second-order separation axiom, since the only part of the second-
order Zermelo theory that adds something over first-order ZFC is the second-order
separation axiom.
Most of the arguments and analysis of this article will simply carry over to
the worldly cardinals. More generally, even without an explicit quasi-categoricity
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result, we may consider the notions of categoricity relative to any fixed class of
cardinals A. For example, we can define that a cardinal κ is sententially categorical
relative to A, if there is a sentence such that Vκ |= σ and κ is only element of A
with that feature; and similarly with theory categoricity and so on. In this way,
versions of our analysis will apply to the class of weakly compact cardinals, say, or
the measurable cardinals or the supercompact cardinals or what have you.
7. Three philosophical issues
For the rest of the article, we should like to engage with several matters of a
more philosophical nature.
7.1. Internal vs. meta-theoretic categoricity. The first matter concerns the
difference between using an internal account of categoricity as opposed to an ex-
ternal or metatheoretic account. To explain, notice that in the main definition of
this article we defined what it means for a cardinal to be first-order sententially
categorical in the same way that we would make any definition in mathematics,
using a background set theory of ZFC, for example. This is an internal account, a
definition made inside the theory, and it can be sensibly applied inside any given
model of ZFC. Every model of ZFC comes after all with its own notions of what it
means to be an ordinal or an inaccessible cardinal, and with its own notions of what
it means to be a sentence or for a sentence to be true in a structure such as Vκ.
The relevance of this is that some models of ZFC are nonstandard, perhaps even
ω-nonstandard, which means they have nonstandard natural numbers and there-
fore also nonstandard sentences and formulas in the language of set theory. Is it
conceivable that such a model might think that a cardinal is sententially categori-
cal, but the sentences witnessing this are all nonstandard? In this case, the model
would think the cardinal is sententially categorical, but outside the model we would
not be able to write down any characterizing sentence.
Indeed, let us prove that this can definitely happen. Suppose that our set-
theoretic universe V has infinitely many inaccessible cardinals, and let us perform
the ultrapower construction by a nonprincipal ultrafilter on ω. In the resulting
model V ∗, let n be a nonstandard natural number, and let κ be the nth inaccessible
cardinal in V ∗ (indexing from 0). This will be a first-order sententially categorical
cardinal in V ∗, according to our main definition, because V ∗κ will be characterized
by the assertion “there are exactly n inaccessible cardinals.” But because n is
nonstandard, however, this is not a standard-length sentence—it is nonstandard.
And furthermore, there is no way to make this assertion with a standard sentence,
because then n would be definable in V ∗, which it cannot be because it is not
in the range of the ultrapower map. Similarly, there can be no standard finite
sentence that characterizes V ∗κ , since any such sentence would make κ definable in
V ∗, which would in turn make n definable, which as we have said is impossible. So
this cardinal κ is categorical in V ∗ according to the internal notion of categoricity
provided by interpreting the main definition inside V ∗, but it is not categorical
in the external model-theoretic sense of being characterized by an actual sentence
in the language of set theory, even when we restrict the comparison only to other
inaccessible cardinals in V ∗. More generally, any statement σ true in some nth V ∗κ
for a nonstandard n will also be true at infinitely many standard-index inaccessible
cardinals, by  Los´’s theorem on ultrapowers.
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Another easy way to see that internal and external notions of categoricity must
differ is by a simple cardinality argument. Namely, if V ∗ is an ultrapower of V by a
nonprincipal ultrafilter on ω, then standard arguments show that V ∗ will have con-
tinuum many natural numbers (counted in V , externally to V ∗). If V has infinitely
many inaccessible cardinals, then V ∗ will have what it thinks is infinitely many
inaccessible cardinals, and this will include continuum many inaccessible cardinals
(counted again in V ) amongst what it thinks are the first ω∗ many. Although V ∗
thinks all these inaccessible cardinals are sententially categorical (since ZFC proves
that the first ω many inaccessible cardinals are sententially categorical), this is too
many for them all to be actually categorical there, since there are only countably
many sentences. So there is a definite difference between the internal notion and
the external meta-theoretic notion.
Which is the right approach? In this article, we had intended to introduce and
analyze categorical cardinals as a large cardinal notion, and so it seemed correct
to do so as an internal conception of ZFC, as one does with all the other large
cardinal notions. This makes categoricity a set-theoretic notion that can be consid-
ered sensibly inside any model of ZFC, and subject to questions about consistency
and forcing and so on. But if one were interested in categoricity exclusively as
a foundational or philosophical matter, then it might seem reasonable that one
would want to insist on actually finite standard sentences to serve as the categor-
ical characterizations. Ultimately, the choice between the two accounts hinges on
how one answers the question: Is a categoricity claim a metatheoretic claim or an
object-theoretic claim?
We said that the two approaches are different, but in fact the external notion is
stronger. If κ is inaccessible inside a modelM and (Vκ)
M is characterized amongst
its competitors in M by an actual sentence σ, that is, by a standard-finite sentence
σ that we can write down in the metatheory, then the copy of this sentence inside
M will serve as a categorical characterization of κ in M . So external categoricity
implies internal categoricity, once one has fixed the model.
And yet, there is another sense in which the two approaches can be seen as
essentially the same. Namely, one understanding of what it means to have an
interpretation of second-order logic is that one has essentially fixed a metatheoretic
set-theoretic background.3 And if one were to treat this set-theoretic background
as a object-theoretic model of set theory, which is essentially to say, if one were to
take that set-theoretic background seriously as a model of set theory, then what
was previously the external conception of categoricity becomes the internal notion
relative to this newly derived model of set theory.
The first author has described how this kind of move—transforming object theory
to metatheory or vice versa—is a natural outcome of the pluralist position in set
theory:
The multiverse perspective ultimately provides what I view as an enlarge-
ment of the theory/metatheory distinction. There are not merely two
sides of this distinction, the object theory and the metatheory; rather,
there is a vast hierarchy of metatheories. Every set-theoretic context, af-
ter all, provides in effect a metatheoretic background for the models and
theories that exist in that context—a model theory for the models and
3The second author emphasizes that one might alternatively view second-order logic through
the lens of plural quantification, Fregean concepts, or some other method conceptually distinct
from set theory, whereas the first author views these still as nevertheless essentially set-theoretic.
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theories one finds there. Every model of set theory provides an interpre-
tation of second-order logic, for example, using the sets and predicates
existing there. Yet a given model of set theory M may itself be a model
inside a larger model of set theory N , and so what previously had been
the absolute set-theoretic background, for the people living inside M ,
becomes just one of the possible models of set theory, from the perspec-
tive of the larger model N . Each metatheoretic context becomes just
another model at the higher level. In this way, we have theory, metathe-
ory, metametatheory, and so on, a vast hierarchy of possible set-theoretic
backgrounds. [Ham21, p. 298]
The deviation between the external, metatheoretic approach and the internal,
object-theoretic approach to categoricity reveals a measure of nonabsoluteness for
categoricity—whether a structure is categorical or not depends on the set-theoretic
background in which the second-order logic is interpreted. In this way, discussions
of categoricity become wrapped up with the debate on set-theoretic pluralism.
7.2. Categoricity as semantic completeness. Next, we should like to discuss
categoricity as a strong form of semantic completeness. A categorical theory com-
pletely determines the structure in which it holds, and in this sense, the theory
also completely determines the truths of that structure. If T is categorical, after
all, then for any assertion ϕ in that language, either T |= ϕ or T |= ¬ϕ, precisely
because either ϕ is true in the unique model of T or it isn’t. Dedekind arithmetic,
for example, is complete in this sense for arithmetic assertions, and the axioms of
a complete ordered field are complete for assertions about the real numbers.
Kreisel [Kre67] argued similarly with second-order set theory, using Zermelo’s
quasi-categoricity result to argue that ZFC2 settles the continuum hypothesis. Since
the truth or falsity of the continuum hypothesis is revealed very low in the set-
theoretic hierarchy, at the level of Vω+2, and since all the models of ZFC2 have the
form Vκ for an inaccessible cardinal κ and these agree on Vω+2, it follows that all
the models of ZFC2 give the same answer for the continuum hypothesis. In this
sense, ZFC2 settles the continuum hypothesis. Daniel Isaacson [Isa11] also defends
this view.
Similar reasoning shows that ZFC2 is complete with respect to nearly the en-
tirety of classical mathematics, which takes place at comparatively low levels of the
set-theoretic hierarchy—mathematicians have argued that Vω+5 is sufficient, but
indeed even Vω+ω or Vω1 would be good enough—the argument shows that ZFC2
is semantically complete with respect to any mathematical question that can be
resolved inside any Vα up to the first inaccessible cardinal.
So it would seem to be great news—our fundamental theory ZFC2 determines
the answer to essentially every mathematical question! Fantastic! Let’s get straight
to work with this theory.
But wait, you say that it isn’t working? We are told that the theory ZFC2
determines the answer to CH and all other classical mathematical questions, but
the disappointment comes when we seem unable to use this theory in any way
to figure out what the answers actually are. The reason is that we lack a sound,
complete, and verifiable proof system for second-order logic, and so we cannot
actually use the completeness of the theory ZFC2 in any mechanistic manner of
reasoning to determine the answer. When working with a second-order theory
what often happens in practice is that one adopts as much of the second-order
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theory as one can, by gathering together the set-existence principles one views as
sound. But to do so is to adopt in the metatheory what amounts to a first-order set
theory such as ZFC. And since this theory does not settle the continuum hypothesis
or even every arithmetic question—it must be incomplete—we are forced to give
up the semantic completeness claim.
The completeness of a first-order theory T (specified by a computable list of
axioms) leads necessarily to a computable decision procedure for the entire content
of the theory. Namely, given any question ϕ, we can search systematically for
a proof T ⊢ ϕ or a refutation T ⊢ ¬ϕ; if the theory is complete, then we will
eventually find one of these and thereby come to the answer of whether ϕ holds
in the theory or not. In second-order logic, however, we have no such complete
proof system and we must remain basically at a loss. For this reason, the semantic
completeness of our second-order set theories is not as useful as it might seem.
The objection we have made so far to the completeness claim for the second-order
theory is about our inability to use it, rather than an ontological point about what
there is and what is true. So let us mount another more serious objection. Namely,
we claim that one cannot deduce the definiteness of our mathematical structures on
the basis of categorical characterizations in second-order logic. What we claim is
that any legitimate metatheoretic aparatus, whether it is second-order logic, plural
quantifiers, Fregean concepts or what have you, faces a certain dichotomy—either
it will be incomplete in the metatheoretic account it provides, like using a first-
order commitment such as ZFC, or else it will be complete, but in a way that begs
the question concerning the definite nature of the metatheoretic ontology. This is
question-begging because we cannot establish the definiteness of the object-theory
set concept by appealing to a presumed definiteness of the meta-theory set concept.
To do so is merely to put off the definiteness objection from the object theory to
the metatheory, but without in any way answering that objection. If someone says
that our concept of set is definite and complete because they have a categorical
account of it in second-order logic, then we would simply want to know why their
metatheoretic concept of set (or of pluralities or Fregean concepts or what have
you) is definite and complete.
The first author argues similarly as follows that the semantic completeness of
the second-order theory ZFC2 is illusory, for all that has happened is that we have
pushed off the incompleteness into the metatheory.
Critics view this [Kreisel’s argument on the determinateness of CH] as
sleight of hand, since second-order logic amounts to set theory itself, in
the metatheory. That is, if the interpretation of second-order logic is seen
as inherently set-theoretic, with no higher claim to absolute meaning or
interpretation than set theory, then to fix an interpretation of second-
order logic is precisely to fix a particular set-theoretic background in
which to interpret second-order claims. And to say that the continuum
hypothesis is determined by [the] second-order set theory is to say that,
no matter which set-theoretic background we have, it either asserts the
continuum hypothesis or it asserts the negation. I find this to be like say-
ing that the exact time and location of one’s death is fully determinate
because whatever the future brings, the actual death will occur at a par-
ticular time and location. But is this a satisfactory proof that the future
is “determinate”? No, for we might regard the future as indeterminate,
even while granting that ultimately something particular must happen.
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Similarly, the proper set-theoretic commitments of our metatheory are
open for discussion, even if any complete specification will ultimately
include either the continuum hypothesis or its negation. Since different
set-theoretic choices for our interpretation of second-order logic will cause
different outcomes for the continuum hypothesis, the principle remains
in this sense indeterminate. [Ham21, p. 288]
We should like to emphasize that this objection applies just as much to the more
ordinary categorical characterizations of mathematical structure. The fact that the
Dedekind axioms for the natural numbers determine a definite structure 〈N, S, 0〉
and therefore determine all the arithmetic truths is not actually helpful for us to
discover those truths. Ultimately, number theorists will find themselves adopting
what amounts to a first-order theory such as PA or ZFC in the metatheory, and
these remain incomplete for arithmetic truth. For analogous reasons, the categor-
ical accounts of the structures Vκ on which we have focussed in this article may
ultimately be less fulfilling than one hoped.
7.3. Categoricity, reflection and realism. Finally, we should like to call atten-
tion to a certain perplexing tension we observe between two fundamental values in
mathematics—the contradictory natures of categoricity and set-theoretic reflection;
the matter deserves philosophical attention.
On the one hand, mathematicians almost universally seek categorical accounts
of their fundamental mathematical structures, from Dedekind’s axiomatization of
arithmetic to the characterization of the real numbers as a complete ordered field.
Categoricity is taken as a positive value and a key general goal in mathematical
practice. At least part of the explanation for this is that the categorical charac-
terizations of our structures seem to give us reason to regard these structures as
definite. We know what we mean by the natural numbers, on this view, precisely be-
cause we can categorically describe the natural number structure. Indeed, because
all our fundamental mathematical structures admit of such categorical characteri-
zations, we thereby have reason to think of them as definite and real, and in this
way categoricity seems to lead to mathematical realism. At the same time, cat-
egoricity seems also to implement structuralism, because the categorical accounts
of our fundamental structures invariably do so only up to isomorphism, and so to
regard every structure that fulfills the characterization as perfectly satisfactory is
precisely to adopt the structuralist stance.
On the other hand, set theorists vigorously defend principles of set-theoretic re-
flection, asserting in various ways that every truth of the full set-theoretic universe
reflects down to the same truth made in a set-sized structure. Reflection is often
described as expressing a core feature of the set-theoretic universe, and indeed the
Le´vy-Montague reflection theorem is equivalent over a weak theory to the replace-
ment axiom of ZFC. Reflection ideas are used not only to justify the ZFC axioms
of set theory, but also the existence of large cardinals [Rei74, Mad88].
The puzzling conflict we aim to highlight between categoricity and reflection is
that reflection is at heart an anti-categorical principle—it asserts explicitly that no
statement characterizes the set-theoretic universe V , that every statement true in
V is also true in a much smaller structure. The philosophical question to sort out
here is how we can regard categoricity as vitally important in all our fundamental
mathematical structures and yet simultaneously assert as a core principle that
the set-theoretic universe itself is not categorical. Ultimately, there must be a
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fundamental mis-match between the extent of the reflection phenomenon and the
complexity of any categorical characterization of the set-theoretic universe, since
the kinds of statements and theories that reflect clearly cannot encompass the
categorical characterization itself, which by the fact of categoricity does not reflect
to any smaller structure.
The tension manifests also in attitudes toward large cardinals. Set theorists com-
monly defend a larger-is-better approach to large cardinals, pointing to the highly
structured tower of consistency strength that they provide and the explanatory
consequences down low of even the strongest large cardinal notions. Yet, as we
have mentioned, categoricity for large cardinals is a smallness notion rather than
a largeness notion. Theorem 13 shows that the categorical cardinals are all below
the least Σ2-correct cardinal, and consequently below every strong cardinal, every
supercompact cardinal, every extendible cardinal, every totally otherworldly cardi-
nal and more. If we look upon categoricity as desireable in a foundational theory,
therefore, we would seem to be pushed toward the low end of the large cardinal
hierarchy, to the smallest large cardinals, to the set-theoretic universes satisfying
categorical theories. For example, the theory ZFC2+“there are no inaccessible car-
dinals” is categorical, as is ZFC2+“there are exactly ω
2+5 inaccessible cardinals.”
But in the philosophy of set theory, one finds instead general arguments against
such theories in the foundations of set theory—they are viewed as restrictive and
limiting. Penelope Maddy [Mad98], for example, formulates the maximize princi-
ple and uses it to explain set theorist’s resistance to the axiom of constructibility
and to large cardinal nonexistence axioms in general on the grounds that they are
restrictive. According to maximize, we should rather seek open-ended, nonlimiting
axiomatizations of set theory. Even critics of Maddy’s position, such as the first
author in [Ham14b], retain an open-ended conception of set theory and do not push
for categoricity in the set-theoretic universe.
Theorem 13 and the idea to which it leads, that categoricity is for small universes
only, seem to suggest that we might not want or expect a categorical account of the
full set-theoretic universe V . According to the toy model perspective (described
in [Ham12], [Ham14b]), one studies the various set models of set theory and how
they relate to one another partly in order to gain insight into the nature of the
larger actual set-theoretic universe in the context of its multiverse including all its
various forcing extensions. The toy models serve as a proxy for the real thing, which
remains inaccessible to us—we look into the toy models to learn what might be true
in V or what we would desire to see in V . When we consider the toy models of
Vκ for inaccessible cardinals κ, we see that it is only the small large cardinals that
realize a categorical theory, while the larger large cardinals do not, and so the toy
model perspective together with maximize seems to incline us to think that the full
universe V should not fulfill a categorical theory. On the toy model perspective,
we might adopt non-categoricity as a goal.
The philosophical problem here is to explain this transition in attitude toward
categoricity. Why do we take categoricity as a fundamental value for smallish
mathematical structures such as the natural numbers, the real numbers and so on,
but not for the set-theoretic universe as a whole?
Let us try to offer a solution by describing a way out of the impasse, even though
ultimately we shall take a different lesson from this analysis. What we claim is that
if one takes second-order logic to have a fixed meaning, one where the metatheoretic
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concept of set obeys something at least like ZFC, then the set-theoretic universe V
does in fact have a categorical characterization in second-order logic. The existence
of this characterization ultimately places limits on the extent of reflection that is
possible for the set-theoretic universe to exhibit.
Specifically, we claim, the class structure of the set-theoretic universe 〈V,∈〉 is
characterized up to isomorphism in second-order logic as the unique well-founded
extensional set-like relation realizing every subset of its domain. In more detail:
(1) The membership relation ∈ is extensional.
x = y ↔ ∀z (z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)
(2) The membership relation ∈ is well founded.
∀A
[
∃aA(a)→ ∃a
(
A(a) ∧ ∀x (x ∈ a→ ¬A(x))
)]
(3) The membership relation ∈ is set-like.
∀a∃A∀x
(
x ∈ a↔ A(x)
)
(4) Every subset of V is realized.
∀A∃a∀x
(
x ∈ a↔ A(x)
)
The lower-case quantifers ∀x quantify over the objects x of the domain V , while
the upper-case quantifiers ∀A are interpreted in second-order logic, ranging over
all subsets of V . Note that V itself will be a proper class in the metatheory, not
a set, and so we emphasize that ∀A means for all subsets A ⊆ V , which will not
include the proper class subclasses of V , such as V itself or the class of ordinals of
V . So this quantifier differs from the class quantifier used in Go¨del-Bernays and
Kelley-Morse set theory. Axiom (2) is the assertion that every nonempty subset
A ⊆ V has an ∈-minimal element. Axiom (3) asserts that the ∈-members of any set
in V form a set—that is, a set in the metatheory, using the second-order concept of
set. Axiom (4) asserts conversely that for every subset A ⊆ V there is an object a
in V whose ∈-elements are the same the elements of A. In this way, axioms (3) and
(4) assert a kind of correspondence between the object theory and the metatheory
as to what the sets are. Note also that axiom (4) makes a stronger claim than the
second-order separation axiom Separation2, which asserts merely that every subset
of a set already in V is in V , whereas our axiom asserts that every subset of V is
in V .
The characterization is entirely about the interplay of the metatheoretic and
object-theoretic concepts of set, and it therefore relies critically on our having al-
ready fixed an interpretation of second-order logic. At bottom what the axiomati-
zation asserts—perhaps disappointingly—is that the set-theoretic structure 〈V,∈〉
implements up to isomorphism exactly the wellfounded cumulative set hierarchy
from the metatheory into the object theory. It copies the metatheory to the object
theory.
To begin the proof of categoricity, let us observe how the process of closing under
all subsets—specified by axiom (4)—proceeds via the cumulative hierarchy. The
axioms successively force certain kinds of objects into V in a transfinite recursive
process. Namely, we begin with nothing V0 = ∅, and at successor stages Vα+1 has
objects realizing every possible subset of Vα; so it is in effect (isomorphic to) the full,
actual power set of Vα as provided by the metatheoretic set concept interpreting
second-order logic. At limit stages λ, we gather together everything we’ve added
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so far Vλ =
⋃
α<λ Vα. The point is that if this is a set, then the closure process
of axiom (4) asserts that Vλ itself must be realized by an element of V , and so
the closure process will continue to Vλ+1 and so on. Ultimately, we build the Vα
hierarchy through all the ordinals of the metatheory and the resulting universe
is V =
⋃
α Vα. This structure fulfills axioms (1) and (2) by construction, since
we assume the metatheoretic set concept is wellfounded and extensional; it fulfills
axiom (3) because we only ever added objects were sets in the metatheory; and it
fulfills axiom (4) since every subset will be bounded in rank, since we presume that
the metatheoretic set concept fulfills the replacement axiom.
To complete the proof of categoricity is now a simple induction on rank. Namely,
if we have two structures
〈
V,∈V
〉
and
〈
W,∈W
〉
satisfying axioms (1), (2), (3) and
(4), then we can construct an isomorphism of the corresponding levels Vα ∼=Wα of
the cumulative hierarchy. Since the membership relations are both well founded,
the two conceptions of ordinals and their stages in the cumulative hierarchy will
both conform with the metatheoretic conception of ordinal. Both hierarchies begin
with nothing, and if we have an isomorphism at level α, then it extends uniquely
to an isomorphism at level α+ 1, since any subset of Vα can be transferred by our
partial isomorphism to a subset ofWα and vice versa. And the partial isomorphisms
union to an isomorphism at the limit stages. It cannot be that one structure stops
growing at a stage while the other continues, since the ordinal heights of the two
stages are isomorphic and so one of them is a set in the metatheory if and only if the
other also is. Finally, this cumulative recursive process must ultimately exhaust the
objects of V andW , since if there is an object a in V outside the Vα hierarchy, then
its members form a set by axiom (3), and its members-of-members and so on, but
this iterated collection (which forms a set in the metatheory since we assume ZFC
in the metatheory) cannot have an ∈V -minimal element b outside the Vα hierarchy,
contrary to axiom (2), since any such object b would have all its ∈V -members inside
the Vα hierarchy, which would place b into the hierarchy at the supremum of those
stages. Thus, the cumulative Vα and Wα hierarchies exhaust all of V and W and
we therefore have an isomorphism of
〈
V,∈V
〉
with
〈
W,∈W
〉
. So this is a categorical
characterization. (This categoricity argument shares an essential similarity to the
central argument of [Mar01], which can be read essentially as a categoricity thesis.)
The key difference between our categorical account and the second-order set the-
ory ZFC2 is that ZFC2 has only the second-order separation axiom rather than our
axiom (4). The second-order separation axiom is insufficient to force the cumulative
hierarchy to keep growing past inaccessible cardinals, since Vκ for κ inaccessible sat-
isfies the second-order separation axiom. But such a structure Vκ does not satisfy
our axiom (4), since κ and Vκ are sets in the metatheory, and so must be added as
elements, causing the hierarchy to keep growing. This key difference in the axioms
is why Zermelo achieves only a quasi-categoricity result, making stops at every
inaccessible cardinal, whereas we are able to achieve full categoricity, proceeding
onward and upward to the full set-theoretic universe.
Note also the difference in kind between the categorical account we have pro-
vided above for the set-theoretic universe V and the notion of categoricity used for
categorical cardinals in the main definition. When defining the categorical cardi-
nals, although we had used a second-order theory for the structure Vκ in question,
ultimately this amounts to a first-order notion in the set-theoretic universe V in
which the definition is considered, since we are in effect quantifying over Vκ+1,
24 JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND HANS ROBIN SOLBERG
which is a set in V . The categorical account of V , in contrast, is not first-order in
V , but second-order over V . For this reason, the notion of categoricity provided in
the categorical account of V is not subject to the conclusion of theorem 13.
Does this categoricity proposal resolve the tension between categoricity and re-
flection? By providing a categorical account of the set-theoretic universe in second-
order logic, it seems both to place categoricity as the more primary notion, and also
to identify limitations on the possible extent of reflection. The reflection principle
cannot rise fully to second-order logic, since one of the truths of the set-theoretic
universe is that it is not a set, and this is a truth that cannot reflect to any actual
set.
But is this categorical account of the set-theoretic universe satisfactory? Does it
enable us to secure a definite meaning for the universe of sets and definite account
for which sets there are? No, not really. Let us criticise it. As we have mentioned,
the characterization proceeds essentially by copying the metatheoretic concept of set
into the object-theoretic account. The categorical account is therefore only sensible
when we have already fixed a meaning of second-order logic, when we have in effect
fixed a set concept in the metatheory. And if we had used a different metatheoretic
concept of set, for example, if a form of set-theoretic pluralism were the case, then
the categorical characterization undertaken with that other concept of set would
give rise to that concept of set as the unique set-theoretic realm. For this reason, the
categorical characterization by itself is without power to refute pluralism or to tell us
which sets there really are. We cannot establish the definiteness of our set concept
on the basis of the categoricity result without presuming the definiteness of the set
concept arising from the interpretation of second-order logic in the metatheory. To
attempt to do so would be circular reasoning that merely pushes off the problem
from the object theory to the metatheory.
The problem is fundamentally similar to the objection we had raised earlier to
Kreisel’s observation that the continuum hypothesis is settled in second-order set
theory. We objected that the argument is circular, because Kreisel’s observation
shows merely that the CH is settled, provided that one has already fixed a complete
concept of set to be used in the metatheoretic interpretation of second-order logic.
But if there were a choice of such metatheoretic set concepts, then it wouldn’t
necessarily be settled the same way by all of them. This is the same circularity
that seems to prevent us from using the categorical account of the set-theoretic
universe to come to an understanding of which sets there are.
The main lesson we propose to take from the categorical characterization of the
set-theoretic universe 〈V,∈〉 is that the obvious circularity and unacceptability of it
help to show how the other second-order characterizations that we have in mathe-
matics are similarly inadequate for establishing definiteness. That is, the circularity
objection applies just as much to Dedekind’s axiomatization of arithmetic and to
the characterization of the real numbers as the unique complete ordered field. The
first author explains it like this:
Some philosophers object that we cannot identify or secure the definite-
ness of our fundamental mathematical structures by means of second-
order categoricity characterizations. Rather, we only do so relative to a
set-theoretic background, and these backgrounds are not absolute. The
proposal is that we know what we mean by the structure of the nat-
ural numbers—it is a definite structure—because Dedekind arithmetic
characterizes this structure uniquely up to isomorphism. The objection
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is that Dedekind arithmetic relies fundamentally on the concept of ar-
bitrary collections of numbers, a concept that is itself less secure and
definite than the natural-number concept with which we are concerned.
If we had doubts about the definiteness of the natural numbers, how
can we assuaged by an argument relying on the comparatively indefi-
nite concept of “arbitrary collection”? Which collections are there? The
categoricity argument takes place in a set-theoretic realm, whose own
definite nature would need to be established in order to use it to estab-
lish definiteness for the natural numbers. [Ham21, p. 32]
Because the second-order accounts presume a set-theoretic realm of second-order
logic, the definiteness of mathematical structure that they provide is only as definite
as the set-theoretic account of the second-order logic itself.
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